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Abstract 
This article is about South Africa in the post-apartheid period. It has two aspects; first it 
examines the social and political process through which the African National Congress 
(ANC) shifted its emphasis away from the construction of the nationalist project (as defined 
by its 1955 Freedom Charter), towards a world view that privileges markets as the main 
organising mechanisms in society. Inevitably, accompanying this shift to neoliberalism there 
has been a corresponding surrender of macroeconomic economic policy autonomy.  Such 
policy is now geared to propitiating global markets that periodically exhibit high degrees of 
instability. The question arises – how is the ANC able to manage two diametrically opposed 
tendencies without social upheaval and dislocation? The answers proffered here centres on 
hegemonic and dependency dynamics that are in motion in contemporary South Africa. 
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Dependency and Hegemony in Neoliberal South Africa  
 “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” 
(Marx, 18
th
 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte) 
 
Introduction 
In the almost quarter of a century since democracy in 1994, South Africa has moved 
ever further away from the ANC’s nationalist project (with sovereignty at its centre), 
and closer and closer towards a more neoliberal vision of how South African society 
is to be constructed. This article examines the ideas that informed the shift in the 
thinking away from the nationalist project towards the world view that privileges 
markets as the main organising mechanisms in society. I contend that the ANC has 
“managed-down” both processes by recasting the national project in terms of the 
creation of a larger and larger group of black middle class social actors.  Following 
Southall (2014), black in this article means black and African. Contemporaneous with 
the development of a black middle class there has been a surrender of autonomy 
with respect to macro-economic policy determination that predisposes the country 
to fragility and instability. I argue that the emergence of this middle class  has been 
used to mitigate the impact of the latter and that this emergent middle class 
conveniently provides the ANC with more votes in the ballot box.  
Dependency and dependent social relations are at the heart of the theorization in this 
article. There are two types of dependency at work. First, there is the dependency 
that typifies the relationship between countries at the centre and countries in the 
periphery of the world system. The second type of dependency is ideological: it 
relates to the consciousness of the social agent and the process through which the 
ideas which inform social behaviour are filtered and maintained. This is particularly 
important in the South African context where the apartheid history imposed 
exclusion of a total type on all non-whites.  In relation to the British West Indies in 
the early 1960’s, CLR James puts the problem well:   
“Our West Indian middle classes are for the most part colored people of some 
education in a formerly slave society. That means for racial and historical reasons 
they are today excluded from those circles which are in control of big industry, 
commerce and finance. They are almost as much excluded from large scale 
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agriculture, sugar for example…thus they as a class of people have no knowledge 
or experience of the productive forces of the country…Thus the class has been and 
is  excluded from the centers of economic life, they have no actual political 
experience, they have no political tradition. (James, 1962)  
James’ observation on the emergent leadership cadre  in the West Indies is central 
and is magnified in its importance in the context of an apartheid South Africa where 
apartheid arrangements formed the basis of a race based total institution society. As 
the ANC entered its negotiations for power in the early 1990s education, training, 
experience and the capability to implement social policy ideas among black Africans 
were all in extremely short supply. This article examines how this social deficit is 
being addressed and its influence on the ordering ANC policy priorities in the post-
apartheid period.  
The article is arranged as follows; part one provides a description of the dependency 
approach that informs the analysis. Part two centres on the reduction of the 
nationalist project to the creation of a new black middle class in the post-apartheid 
period. Part three turns to the issue of hegemony that is at the theoretical centre of 
the article. I show how neoliberal hegemony has been constructed and maintained 
through a technocratic capture of a part of the state apparatus. Part four concludes. 
1.0 Dependency Approach 
I adopt a dependency approach drawn from the underdevelopment school to theorise 
South Africa. ; Notable adherents include Samir Amin, A.M. Babu, George Beckford, 
Lloyd Best, Frantz Fanon, Ruth First, Andre Gunder Frank, Guy Mhone, Kari 
Polanyi Levitt, Thandika Mkandawire, Sam Moyo, Dani Nabudere, Prabhat Patnaik, 
Walter Rodney and Issa Shivji. The key idea and common thread in this school of 
thought is that a large part of Africa’s, Asia’s and Latin America’s 
underdevelopment arises as a result of  Europe’s development in a world that is 
analytically divided into a centre and a periphery characterised by unequal exchange 
between the two. There are many points of departure among the various writers but 
their unity rests on three basic understandings:  
1. Capitalism is and always has been a global system with the locus of power 
and wealth domiciled in the centre (or core) countries, and with 
disempowerment and underdevelopment being the chief features in the 
peripheral countries. In the more contemporary nomenclature this roughly 
equates to the global north and south.  
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2. Capitalism’s development has always been uneven. That is to say that it’s 
penetration or advance in some countries (and of some regions within 
countries) is at a much faster and deeper rate than in other places. As it 
proceeds in its uneven manner it throws up inequality and divides the world 
into haves and have nots.  
3. The theory and propositions that emerge from such an approach are the 
product historical layering where theory is premised upon historical 
experience.  
The various theorists generally work in three theoretical frameworks Unequal 
Exchange, World Systems and Dependencia. Unequal exchange proponents employ 
a neo Marxian framework in which the history in terms of primitive accumulation 
and imperialism where the law of value plays a central role. World Systems theorists 
take their lead from Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovani Arrighi and are united by 
the notion that the global system shapes the conditions of each country’s 
development at the national level. Dependencia proponents inspired by Andre 
Gunder Frank emphasised the nature of Latin America’s insertion into the world 
system in the 1500s (as a primary and raw material producer) as the source of 
underdevelopment.  
In this article I use the ideas from Beckford (1972), Best (1968) and Best and Levitt 
(1975) characteristic of the plantation dependencia approach to theorise apartheid 
South Africa.  For Beckford, the world system refers to the “set of relations governing 
the component parts that make up the whole. In any such network of relations there is a 
coming together of the component parts at some point for some common purpose. It is this 
organization that makes the set of relations a system. The institution which provides the 
organization gives character to the whole – the system.” (Beckford; 1972, 9) Locally, 
decision making is highly centralized business and the pattern of management 
organization is authoritarian. Workers and decision makers are separated by social 
and cultural differences. “Authority and control are inherent in the system.” Further the 
plantation is geographically isolated and so those who live within its boundaries 
cannot easily enjoy interaction with the outside world. Because of this isolation, 
“people living and working on a plantation make up a distinct community which derives its 
full flavour from the system itself.” Thus, in addition to being a system of production, 
the plantation is a community. And as the community exists because of the unit of 
production the resulting social structure and pattern of interpersonal relations 
reflects the type of economic organization that governs production. The authority 
structure that characterizes the pattern of economic organization extends to social 
relationships and what is left is a “…inherently rigid system of social stratification…” 
5 
 
normally with whites as owners or managers at the top, culturally mixed skilled 
personnel in the middle and culturally different (black) unskilled labourers at the 
bottom (Beckford, 1972, 53-54). The predominant social characteristics of all 
plantations areas of the world is the existence of a class – caste system based on 
differences in the racial origins of plantation workers on the one hand and owners 
on the other. Race was thus a convenient means of controlling labour1. (ibid 67) 
 
I utilise RT Smith’s depiction of the “total institution” to model social relations in 
modern South Africa. In Smith’s use of the term a total institution is one that is a 
bureaucratically organized that treats blocks of people as units and are marched 
through a set of regimentation under the close surveillance of the small supervisory 
staff. From the outset apartheid state represented a unit of authority with control 
over all aspects of the lives of people within its territory. Heavily reliant on migrant 
labour of different ethnic and cultural origins the mines also provided “the locus of 
rules of accommodation between different groups.” What results is a social system with 
“…all or many of the characteristics of a total state with a classification of people into 
different statuses together with a formal definition of the relationship between them.”  
 
The key to contemporary South Africa is an understanding that it was founded as an 
extension – the overseas economy – of capitalism whose goal was to provide mineral 
inputs for the industrial capitalism of the centre. As such, reinvestment in the social 
infrastructure which would extend the internal linkages (backward and forward) 
and enhance the reproduction of capital, labour and internal consumer markets were 
mostly absent. South Africa was therefore tied to, and dependent on the capitalism 
of the centre in a manner that blocked the development and reproduction of any 
independent mode of production. The domestic mode of production and its 
reproduction stand facing the enclave-capitalist sector(s) in sharp antagonism 
(Meeks and Lindhal, ibid, 49). Here, there is much more than class struggle. There is 
national-racial-class struggle.  
 
1.1 Modern South Africa 
Modern South Africa begins with Cecil Rhodes and the founding of DeBeers 
Consolidated Mines in 1888. Consolidation is the key word. DeBeers completed 
what represented an “amalgamation” of the diamond industry in the ensuing years 
                                                          
1
 Best and Levitt’s further theorisation of the Pure Plantation model yielded a series of plantation 
inspired models around bauxite, oil and gas. 
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(Chabane et al 2006). Consolidation meant that Rhodes and DeBeers gained a degree 
of monopoly power over the diamond mines. From the outset South Africa’s story 
has a distinctly financial aspect. Because mining (especially deep earth mining) 
demands large amounts of capital investment, and because economies of scale play 
such an important part in mining large amounts of money capital had to be sourced. 
Here the international community played a large part. Funding of the mines in 
South Africa came from the finance fraction in the Anglo Saxon world, thus capital 
from Great Britain and the USA played a large part in extending DeBeers’ reach and 
monopoly power.   
In 1924 Anglo-American Corporation (AAC)2 became the largest single shareholder 
in De Beers. “Capital for its formation came from Britain, the US, and South Africa. The 
company aimed to exploit the gold mining potential of the East Rand. In 1924, Oppenheimer 
made AAC and established a cross-holding linking the two companies in 1929. This type of 
cross listing that connects companies in an intricate web of shareholdings” (McKenzie, 
2016). The formation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in 1887 gave these 
key companies the ability to raise much larger amounts of money capital for 
investment and expansion of the industry. By bringing together surplus units with 
deficit fractions it socialises and therefore enlarge sums of saving available for 
investment. For the companies concerned the ability to raise capital through the 
issue of shares on the JSE offered a new route to expanding the company’s value that 
was purely financial (and not rooted in the real economy).  
 
Modern South Africa’s key formative feature was the alliance/union between mining 
and global finance capital through the JSE. This union has produced an unusually 
high degree of business concentration. Each mining house3 developed its own 
finance arm and together they acquired substantial interest and oligopoly control 
over the rest of the economy (transport construction, retail, etc.). Here finance 
functioned as the organising mechanism for industry in a system of interlocking 
directorships. These are the origins of the very high degree of concentration in the 
contemporary business arrangements of South Africa. 
 
Pitted against capital was labour. The labour was for the most part black and the 
nature of the project at the time of origin was imperialistic in character. For Rhodes 
the Anglo Saxon race was “the first race in the world.” (Castle, 2016)  That the labour 
                                                          
2
 AAC was formed by Ernest Oppenheimer in 1917. 
3
 Of which there were only a handful in the first place. 
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force was mostly black and African and that the managers and owners of capital 
were all white  and given that the project at inception was one of governing and 
controlling subject peoples for the betterment of humanity, capitalism in its 
apartheid form was racial capitalism (Kaplinsky 1991, 50). Apartheid is unique in 
that it builds on discernible inequality of living conditions and life chances. Such an 
arrangement of social relations produces a highly unequal social and economic 
system where whiteness involves inclusion and privilege, and blackness, exclusion 
and relative poverty. This racial capitalism is unique among the varieties of 
capitalism. 
 
The strategy of accumulation based on the maintenance of inequalities provided 
conditions for sustained accumulation during the 1950s and 1960s. Thereafter, and 
particularly throughout the 1980s, the accumulation strategy failed largely as a result 
of the contradictions inherent in the strategy of accumulation through inequality 
(Kaplinsky, 1991). In addition to failure of apartheid to deliver sustained growth in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the apartheid era saw the development of South Africa’s 
industrial structure characterised by high capital intensity, with very limited 
opportunities for the expansion of waged labour - particularly amongst the black 
population. The policies pursued by ANC led Democratic South Africa have done 
little to change the structure of the South African economy. Indeed, I argue that 
exclusion in South Africa has been further reinforced despite the very real attempts 
to construct a black and prosperous middle class. The main features of the period 
since 1994 are the increased a financialisation of social relations and increasing 
inequality.  Instead of a decisive break with the past there is the continuity of the 
accumulation through inequality growth path forged in the apartheid period. The 
economy as it was at inception is still dominated by an elite but now state power 
coexists with corporate power while power is simultaneously contested and shared 
by a power-elite (Southall 2014, 651).  
 
2.0 Nationalist project redefined  
 
This section turns to the managing down of the nationalist project. It includes an 
evaluation of the class and class dynamics that influenced this process, of necessity it 
involves a consideration of the ANC’s role in shaping the present realities. 
The ANC was formed in 1912 by a small group of Africans who had been educated 
in the mission schools. The education is important because it gave to the ANC its 
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initial orientation which was premised on social and economic liberalism embodied 
in the colonial education system.  The ANC was not at all times consistent in its 
support of working class struggle in South Africa. Indeed it was only transformed 
into a mass movement after the formation of the ANC Youth League and the 
demission from office by the Xuma old guard. It then threw its lot in with the 
working class and became a mass movement. The key to understanding the ANC 
approach lies in the idea of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR) as conceived 
by the SACP (and subsequently embraced by the ANC and COSATU). In the first 
phase there would be an anti-colonial struggle in which black Africans would break 
the yolk and free themselves from racial domination. In the second phase a capitalist 
phase of national democracy would ensue in which a black capitalist class would 
emerge as a patriotic bourgeoisie who would raise the productive forces of the 
society and transform the society to a higher stage of socialism. 
In general, it needs to be said that black middle class support for progressive change 
was never unanimous and never unambiguous. “Many if not most middle class 
Africans were, if not actually acceptant of defeat, then acquiescent in their racial  
subordination” (Southall, 2014, 653) This was all to change in the 1980’s with the rise 
of the Black Consciousness and Steve Biko4. 
In 1955 the ANC deployed fifty thousand of its members around the country to 
gather information that would form the basis for a Freedom Charter that would give 
voice to the country’s dispossessed African workers. The Freedom Charter was 
ratified and adopted in June 1955 at a Congress of the People in Kliptown (one of the 
oldest settlements in Soweto). It was essentially an equal rights document that called 
among other things for: 
 Free education for all  
 Shorter hours and a living wage 
 Land reform that would redistribute land in favour of dispossessed Africans 
 Nationalisation of the land and mines 
In this article, the ANC Freedom Charter represents the embodiment of the 
nationalist project in one document. It represented the aspirations of black South 
Africans who were out to construct a society with equal rights and justice at its heart. 
When the ANC acceded to power in May 1994, the new Constitution of post-
apartheid Democratic South Africa contained all of the human rights aspirations of 
                                                          
4
 The 1980’s ….. 
9 
 
the 1955 Freedom Charter - what was conspicuously absent was any reference to 
nationalisation of the mines or the redistribution of land. What explains the absence?  
At some time in 1991 Mandela made foreign investment a priority and thereafter 
began to treat nationalisation with benign neglect. Hirsch (2005, 30, cited in Freund 
2013, 526) attributes Mandela’s abandonment of nationalisation to his attendance of 
a 1991 Davos meeting of powerful economic and political figures. At this meeting 
China, Vietnam, and Holland all advised against nationalisation (Gumede 2008, 69, 
ibid). By November 1991 Mandela writing in the Financial Times was telling the 
world that one had to choose between nationalisation and attracting foreign 
investment (Habib 1996, 161, ibid). By the time of the ANC National Executive 
Committee (NEC) Nasrec meeting of April 1992 nationalisation was virtually erased 
from the agenda (Hirsch 2005, 52–53 in Fruend, 2013). “This ANC NEC in 1992 still 
made some gestures in the direction of a radical economic policy in Ready to Govern but the 
1993 meeting, engineered by Mandela and Mbeki, was fairly unequivocally committed to 
orthodoxy and continuity on most issues” (Gumede, 2008, 71, ibid). In return for placing 
self-interest centre stage, increasing trust was placed in Mandela, Mbeki, Manuel 
and others in the ANC hierarchy; this gave the ANC elite insider access to many 
international elite fora (Bond, 2007, 97).  
Prior to democracy the ANC leadership, “were subjected not only to the sugar cube of 
understanding chat about the evils of racism and the need for change, but also to the stick of 
what might happen if they tried to defy business consensus, both nationally and 
internationally”(Freund,??). One should not underestimate the role of the doyen of 
South African business, the richest South African of them all, Harry Oppenheimer 
played in getting the ANC to abandon its radical stance and acceptance of a business 
friendly neoliberal paradigm. Oppenheimer formed the Brenthurst Group, which 
met regularly with Mandela and others (Sparks 2003; Terreblanche 2012, 63). He and 
others threw open their amenities to the leadership in waiting, and were willing to 
accept many aspects of what Freund calls the ANC desiderata. Crucially the 
Brenthurst Group and enlightened capitalism in general were willing to accept the 
notion of creating some black participants in big business. In the crucial years 
leading up to the transition and for some years after Brenthurst became trusted as 
consultants on areas that mattered most to them. Thus, the Brenthurst Group was 
listened to respectfully and its suggestions and amendments taken up by the ANC 
leadership (Gumede 2008, 79). The influence of South African business was also 
important. On the South African corporate side, a series of scenario presentations, 
one from Old Mutual/Nedcor (endorsed in a blurb by Ramaphosa) (Bond 2000, 58), a 
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second from Sanlam and perhaps most influential the Mont Fleur bird flight 
simulations5 of August 1992, by some of the biggest players in South African 
capitalism, were some of the best known (Gumede 2008, 72). Only two months later 
came the ANC’s Ready to Govern with an explicit endorsement of free market 
capitalism and neoliberalism. This is a decisive moment, the ANC without 
experience of industry, commerce, finance and politics and economics signalled to 
the world that it had learned lessons and was now sufficiently mature to govern in a 
responsible and adult manner. In so doing, the first major act of the incoming ANC 
led alliance was to embrace the neoliberal programme of the Brenthurst Group, the 
IMF and international capitalism. This is the moment at which the dye was cast and 
it serves to explain much of what we have come to know as contemporary South 
Africa 
 
2.1 Aligning the NDR  
There can be no doubt that the ANC leadership was influenced by economic and 
geo-political developments of the period. The tearing down the Berlin Wall in 1989 
removed the Soviet Union on whom the ANC had depended for much of its support 
from the equation. The structural power of markets to punish states that fly in the 
face of the conventional wisdom is another influence that softened any enthusiasm 
for more radical reform among ANC policy makers. According to Koelble and 
LiPuma (2006):  “...the globalizing processes now in  motion impose such powerful 
constraints especially on middle income countries that they motivate all but the most globally 
financially independent regimes (such as Iran) to adopt some variant of the Euro American 
neo liberal democracy. From our point of view, the ongoing transformation of capitalism is 
producing a global financial market and accompanying social institutions that engender 
economic constraints and threaten political consequences so powerful that they are coercing 
the entire gamut of regime types, from authoritarian to socialist, to adopt the neo liberal 
version of democracy favoured by markets.”   This line of argument was a common one 
among the ANC policy makers in South Africa. Alec Erwin a member of the ANC’s 
(NEC) and former Minister of Trade and Industry has argued that South Africa’s 
choices are limited to, “implementing policy packages that are similar to those of 
other developing countries” (Marais; 2011, 112). And in 1997, Mandela himself 
argued that integration of the capital markets “made it impossible to decide national 
economic policy without regard for the likely response of the markets” (ibid). 
Notwithstanding the undoubted power and influence of international markets, as 
                                                          
5
 The flamingo pattern was particularly embraced by Manuel, which made everything clear to him in 
his own words (Giliomee 2012, 351; Sparks 2003). 
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Marais (2011, 112) observes, “...most promising emerging economies were violating 
many of the rules the South African government was straining to obey.”6 
There is however a deeper, more intricate explanation of the shift in thinking away 
from nationalisation of the mines and the redistribution of the land that is cast in 
terms of affinities in the literature on the subject. But this literature has not so far 
sought to lay out in sufficient detail how historical deficits gave the whole process its 
dynamic. On the level of ideas there was convergence between the NDR and the 
creation of a black middle class posited by international capitalism. Through this 
joining of ideas the ANC has sought to reconcile its embrace of neo liberal ideas with 
its ultimate aim of democratic transformation. Within the ANC itself, what 
happened was that the working class black consciousness of Steve Biko was 
supplanted by the more conservative African Renaissance of Thabo Mbeki. 
 
Arguably the single most important person in opening up the country to 
international capitalism was Thabo Mbeki.7 According to Freund (2013, 521); “Mbeki 
had little interest in the old left or the new left in socialist thinking or in radical democratic 
ideas; instead he was consumed from what we know in hindsight by a dislike for Western 
political power in the world and primarily committed to intensive racial ‘affirmative action’ 
domestically, while accepting the existing economic world order as a given.” Mbeki is 
essentially a nationalist. He is anti-socialist and is fiercely opposed to the arrogance 
of the West. The centrepiece of his viewpoint is the African Renaissance first 
articulated by Diop in 1946 that celebrates “Africaness” and is buttressed by Ubuntu 
and the nationalist propositions that flow from Ubuntu.  
 
2.1 Black Economic Empowerment  
 
The ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme has its origins in 
Ubuntu and is very much at the heart of Mbeki’s African Renaissance. The aim is to 
right historical wrongs; it sought to do so by promoting ownership among black 
Africans who had been historically disadvantaged by imperialism and apartheid. 
This is what the party sees as it is historical mission and it is how the party has 
conceived of redressing the historical inequalities between races and social classes in 
                                                          
6
 “The management of capital flows provides an example of the conservatism of South Africa's 
monetary policy. Indeed, long after the IMF itself gave its blessing to the use of controls in managing 
capital flows, the South African policymakers cling steadfastly to the more conservative approaches.” 
(See McKenzie, 2016). 
7
 According to Freund (ibid), “Arguably the most important single architect of the ‘new South Africa.” 
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South Africa. Importantly it allows the ANC to pursue the NDR as its main priority. 
Thabo Mbeki placed BEE at the heart of ANC social policy at inception in 1994 and it 
has been pursued in one form or another into the contemporary period.  
 
The unique achievement of Mbeki was to twin neoliberal privatisation to BEE. In the 
1990’s, privatisation although it aligned well with BEE proved to be politically 
charged. Under Mbeki’s stewardship privatisation was made into a vehicle for 
channelling economic power to the historically disadvantaged. Because of their 
spatial dispersion and their range of activities parastatals and public works projects 
emerged as suitable vehicles for the delivery of BEE. What Mbeki saw was that as 
State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) were territorially dispersed around the country 
they would enhance the state’s ability to allocate jobs, management positions and 
procurement among black groups in South Africa.  This was a key insight; it meant 
among other things that powerful unions could be appeased and that well paid 
management positions would induce political support from a new black middle 
class. In essence, the ANC provides, “opportunities for educated black South Africans to 
join the middle class. …In return, the party sustains the political loyalty of its supporters.” 
(Southall, 2014, ??) Public works projects and procurement provisions backed up by 
empowerment legislation married business both politically and economically to the 
state8. Privatisation became a key instrument connecting marriage between the state 
to capital through the expansion of black ownership. (ibid) 
 
Established firms with large capital projects have been the prime targets for 
extending BEE. Regulating these firms via requirements regarding the inclusion of 
historically disadvantaged groups gives the state some degree of control over 
business. Counter balancing this new development as Nattrass and Seekings (2010) 
point out, is the large size of South Africa’s economy and the strength of civil 
society9.  
 
                                                          
8 These arrangements (procurement, management positions, empowerment funds, and shares) make 
it possible for political supporters to earn enormous rents.  
 
9 That the state and business have become more closely intertwined is not without historical 
precedent in South Africa; the Nationalist Party had used the public sector as a source of employment 
for its jobless white constituency in the first half of the twentieth century. The ANC simply repeated the 
exercise albeit on behalf of a different social group. In effect, linkages between parastatals and private 
capital were deepened and extended revealing a surprising amount of continuity with the past.  
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The parastatals, public works projects, state managed asset funds, and public–
private partnerships (PPPs), preferential procurement, were the interwoven 
instruments for the implementation of these initiatives. Government emphasised the 
importance of state owned enterprise (SOEs) in creating employment, providing 
public goods, and supporting black economic empowerment. The big and 
overarching achievement of the ANC government was to frame these developmental 
ideas in a trinity that spoke to the competitiveness, productivity, and profitability of 
the neo-liberal project. In contemporary South Africa SOEs are used by the ANC to: 
 
 provide managerial positions for the historically disadvantaged 
 provide union jobs in a weakening economy and sustained the formal sector. 
 meet most government targets with regard to employment equity for blacks, 
women, and persons with disabilities.  
 
The end result is that the public sector is now being used to create and incubate a 
black middle class.  Supported by the empowerment legislation the black 
beneficiaries of privatisation and/or restructuring have extended far beyond the 
established elites to include black entrepreneurs10. As a result Pitcher reports, “... the 
share of black South Africans in private sector management has climbed from 18.5% 
in 2000 to 32.5% in 2008 (Southall 2010, 11).” statistical review needed here! 
 
What the ANC has skilfully been able to do is to substitute the nationalist project 
with empowerment. Empowerment is how the ANC has chosen to construct the 
equal rights and justice thrust of the Freedom Charter. In so doing the ANC has 
managed down the importance the nationalist project encapsulated in the Freedom 
Charter without observable adverse effects. Key in this process has been social policy 
on education. Demands for universal free access to education formed part of the 
original 1955 Freedom Charter and by emphasising this aspect the ANC can 
legitimately claim continuity and consistency with the previous period of nationalist 
struggle. The message is that education brings empowerment and empowerment 
means entry into the black middle class. In general, the current priorities were 
clearly identified long ago by the old guard ANC president-general Dr Xuma; “It is 
of less importance to us whether capitalism is smashed or not. It is of greater importance to us 
that while capitalism exists, we must fight and struggle to get our full share and benefit from 
                                                          
10
 Relaxation of restrictions upon African business, first in the homelands, subsequently in urban areas in a 
process that started  in the 1970’s facilitated the expansion of a black entrepreneurial stratum in what Kane –
Berman (1991) described as a silent revolution 
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the system” (Zelig, 2002, 205). The proposition in this article is that the post-apartheid 
ANC leadership has remained true to this vision. 
  
4.0 Hegemony 
Dependency on world markets and the hegemony of ideas are the two main features 
of contemporary South Africa that concern this article. The post-colonial deficit first 
observed by James was a crucial determining factor in framing the outcomes of 
negotiations. The alliance negotiating team were negotiating in effect with those who 
had taught them, those who had groomed them and those who they depended on 
for entry to elite international fora. In practical terms what resulted from the 
negotiations was a new division of responsibilities where all the departments of state 
power were passed to the ANC led alliance and local and international capital 
retained control of the Ministry of Finance, the National Treasury, its associated 
agencies and the Reserve Bank, which constitutes the financial cluster of the state. It 
appears that finance and economics were ring-fenced and in the years since 
democracy the power and control that local and international capitalism exerts over 
this cluster has been steadily augmented. 
“Neoliberalism as a political ideology has been conceptualised, then implemented 
through one main channel: macro-economic policies” (Grabel 2000, in Segatti and 
Pons-Vignon, 2013, 538).  Neoliberalism has been implemented via one main 
platform – macro-economic policy. That is to say the ideas that inform macro-
economic policy are the main staging post for further deeper forays into society and 
the economy. In South Africa the key vehicle for the implementation of these ideas 
has been the National Treasury (NT). So the first part of the neoliberal incursion is 
ideological and the second is institutional. According to Segatti and Pons-Vignon 
(ibid), “The NT dominance and hegemony over macro-economic policy in a process of 
institutional capture that begun in earnest as a product of the negotiated settlement.” The 
obvious problem with negotiated settlements is that they inevitably involve 
compromises and trade-offs. After the negotiations what emerged was African 
control of the political sphere and big business (white monopoly capital in the 
language of the period) control of the economic domain. Segatti and Pons Vingnon 
(ibid) report that among the ANC led negotiation team, “no one from the ANC and 
Union side could be considered sophisticated ideologues or economists.” This was 
the post-colonial deficit at work it gave rise to a clear division of responsibilities 
where business controlled the economy and the ANC the political process. 
Effectively, the settlement made sure that Africans were shut out of this most 
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important sector of national life and what may seem surprising is that the ANC 
agreed to these arrangements. The suggestion here is that the ANC negotiators did 
not fully grasp what they had given up and the agreement was born out of the 
asymmetrical power relations of the post-colonial deficit. 
 
Palma (2011, 136) observes, ‘what is particularly remarkable about neoliberalism . . . 
is its capacity to achieve this [“remarkable asymmetric distributional outcomes 
within democracies”] . . . mostly by ideological conviction.’  The conviction here is 
the conviction that markets are the very best way to organise society because they 
are the “natural” outcome of human development to date. None of this is predicated 
on best practice or the best available evidence it is purely a matter of belief and faith. 
Looked at in this manner the pursuit of a neoliberal order speaks directly to the issue 
of hegemony over ideas. In South Africa the hegemony is engineered and supported 
through the NT. In South Africa, this means that two opposing world views both 
based on conviction were placed in opposition to each other. The nationalist project 
was built on the conviction that equal rights and redistribution is morally correct 
and moreover it represented the legitimate aspirations of South Africa’s black 
majority. The question then arises how have the ANC as the party in power been 
able to manage two diametrically opposed processes that, one that proclaims self-
determination and sovereignty and the other insisting on a surrender of control over 
the economy? 
 
Following Hall’s (1979) seminal analysis of the rise of the radical right in the UK, I 
posit that the ANC has to be understood in direct relation to alternative political 
formations attempting to occupy and command the same political space. It is an 
exceedingly large union of social democrats, trade unionists, communists and 
engages in a struggle for hegemony against both left and right wings of its own 
party and beyond. Not only is it operating in the same space as others contesting 
political power it is working directly on the contradictions within these competing 
positions. The strength of the ANC intervention lies in the radicalism of its 
commitment to break the mould by creating a patriotic black middle class. In doing 
so, the ANC has taken the elements which were already constructed dismantled 
them, and reconstituted them into a new logic, that articulates the space in a new 
way.   At the level of organizing theoretical ideologies, BEE has been the lynch-pin of 
the theoretical ideologies of state intervention since democracy in 1994 assuming 
almost the status of a sacred orthodoxy or doxa.    
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In the hands of the ANC BEE provides a powerful means of popularizing the 
principles of neoliberalism. The heterodox literature on South Africa does not 
engage with race in any meaningful manner. The idea of a National Democratic 
Revolution conceived by the SACP and adopted by the ANC and COSATU fills this 
space. According to that narrative, Colonisation of a Special Type (CST) i.e. 
apartheid was an expression of monopoly capitalism. What this meant was that 
black South Africans were the colonial subjects of white South Africans (Zelig, 203). 
It followed that black South Africans in the first stage of a two stage revolution must 
first be liberated from colonialism and in the second stage there would be a socialist 
revolution led by the patriotic nationalist bourgeoisie that would raise the 
productive powers of the society leading to a socialist revolution. But by 
intertwining the national and democratic elements of the revolutionary process   the 
class contradictions between workers and bourgeois nationalism, black, coloured, 
Indian and white workers are all obscured. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
The previous sections have sought to lay out the internal and external forces that 
constrain South African development under the ANC. In this section I want to 
briefly outline how these main forces have interacted to shape the existing social 
reality in South Africa.  
Beyond this there was the systematic grooming of the ANC top echelons by local 
and international capitalism documented earlier in this article. When in August 2003 
Mandela addressed the local business and social elites and said, ‘I am sure that Cecil 
John Rhodes would have given his approval to this effort to make the South African economy 
of the early 21st century appropriate and fit for its time.” … the grooming was complete 
and the ideological battle was well and truly won.  
 
These social and economic outcomes are consistent with a dependency analysis 
where current social processes are in the first place conditioned by historical 
legacies. Within this context the ANC has demonstrated considerably agency; the 
main achievement of the ANC has been the numerical expansion of a black middle 
class in the country. My contention is that this is the outcome of the nationalist 
project redefined by the ANC in the post-apartheid period. It is the expansion of 
access to education has been the fulcrum that determines entry to the middle class 
among the African people. Tapping into a type of Horatio Alger type mindset the 
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ANC has been able to connect with the mass of black people and to manage down 
the importance of nationalization of the land and the mines in the popular 
consciousness. The nationalist project now means getting one’s full share and entry 
to the middle class prepares one to do so.  
South Africa’s class structure is here conceived as a pyramid with three tiers after 
Seekings and Natrass, (2006). The base is made up of formal and informal casual 
workers alongside the marginalised grant dependent working class. The narrowing 
tier in the middle is composed of semi- professionals (teachers and nurses alongside 
white collar workers and formally employed workers. Management professionals 
and the independently rich, make up the top tier. According to the authors the 
growing black middle class within the second tier, new black elite penetrating the 
upper classes-“the most dramatic shift in the social landscape after 1994” 
The ANC can easily claim that its efforts are in line with the narrative of the NDR. 
But the logic falls down when we examine the social and circumstances in which this 
middle class is being created. So far the outcome of the ANC’s effort is a consumerist 
black middle class engaged in speculative rentier behaviour, funded by bank credit.  
According to the logic of the NDR this middle class are to comprise a patriotic 
bourgeoisie that would raise the productive powers of the country.  Here the 
problem is not only the periodic crises that constrain the confidence of the middle 
class and confine it to comprador status, but also the neoliberal social context in 
which this class is being incubated of necessity breeds what Fanon would have 
termed bourgeois mind sets far more aligned with the culture of capitalism in the 
metropole 
 
One crucial aspect of the analysis in Fanon that is often missed is that the social and 
economic outcomes that manifested in post-colonial Africa were never solely the 
result of a mutilated people, mutilated by a mutilating colonizer. (ibid, 149) In Fanon 
these social outcomes also derive from the “intellectual laziness, spiritual penury 
and a profoundly cosmopolitan mind set” of the national bourgeois classes in the 
global south. But in South Africa the ANC has shown considerable alacrity and 
agency in managing its policy priorities while moving South Africa decisively 
towards the neoliberal public policies practiced elsewhere (Bond, 2016). By tying it 
itself to a BEE that ultimately penetrates the boardrooms of the corporations, the 
ANC reproduces the main feature of dependency arrangements. – patron client 
relations that define the social system. A middle class created and nurtured by the 
ANC will not bite the hand that feeds it; it is far more likely that this class will for the 
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foreseeable future continue to support the ANC at the ballot box as it is the ANC 
that guarantees its progress and growth. 
 
Fanon would argue that it is the only way that a middle class leadership with 
bourgeois mind set could conceive of the national project. The weight of a total 
institution, the epistemological vacuum engendered by exclusion propelled South 
Africa’s ANC leadership towards a low risk path that was consistent with the 
conservative nature of its class character. My argument is that the post-colonial 
deficit along with the grooming of the ANC leadership were material forces in 
conditioning the response of the ANC to the neoliberal imperative. The turn to 
neoliberalism started in the 1980’s and was complete and official by the time Ready 
to Govern was published. Since then neoliberalism has revealed itself on the ground 
as colonialism in another guise. There is obvious historical continuity in that BEE 
reproduces the classic features of dependency in the patron client relationships that 
it reproduces. But it is not simply the case that social actors are trapped as products 
of history. There is agency as well. By marrying the state to business through BEE 
the ANC has assumed some limited power and control over business and the 
economy. The party obviously wants more control as the recent controversy on 
white monopoly capital evidences. The real power of the ANC approach lies in its 
ability to connect whiteness to capitalism through the NDR. Here the ANC takes the 
moral high ground. But as Fanon foretold – in the post-colonial setting, capitalism is 
not necessarily only and always white. 
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